Europe needs Turkey more than it has in decades. Yet one unresolved dispute continues to stand between Ankara and a deeper strategic partnership with the European Union: Cyprus.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe’s security calculations. The continent is rearming at a pace unseen since the Cold War, while repeated calls from Washington for Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own defence have accelerated plans for a stronger European military-industrial base.
In this rapidly changing geopolitical environment, Turkey has re-emerged as a strategic actor that Brussels can no longer ignore.
With NATO’s second-largest military, a rapidly expanding defence industry and a unique position linking Europe, the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara has become an increasingly valuable partner for European security planners.
Yet despite this renewed strategic importance, one issue continues to limit any meaningful breakthrough in EU-Turkey defence cooperation.
The Cyprus question.
A strategic partner Europe cannot fully embrace
Over the past two years, several European capitals have reassessed Turkey’s geopolitical value.
Germany has openly supported closer defence cooperation with Ankara, viewing Turkey as an indispensable NATO ally capable of contributing to Europe’s security in an increasingly unstable neighbourhood.
Berlin’s position is reflected in Turkey’s participation in the European Sky Shield Initiative, the German-led missile and air defence project designed to strengthen Europe’s collective protection against emerging threats.
For many policymakers, Turkey is no longer simply a regional power.
It is becoming an essential pillar of Europe’s future security architecture.
Not everyone shares Berlin’s vision
France remains considerably more cautious.
Paris continues to advocate greater European strategic autonomy and prefers limiting dependence on non-EU partners, even when those partners are NATO allies.
But the strongest political resistance comes from Cyprus, backed consistently by Greece.
For Nicosia, the issue is not military capability or industrial cooperation.
It is sovereignty.
Successive Cypriot governments have argued that a country maintaining military forces in the northern part of an EU member state cannot simultaneously participate in the Union’s flagship defence programmes.
From Cyprus’ perspective, security cooperation cannot be separated from the island’s unresolved political division.
SAFE and EDIP become the new battleground
This disagreement has now moved into Europe’s emerging defence architecture.
The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme, worth around €150 billion, represents one of the largest defence financing initiatives in EU history and forms part of the broader Readiness 2030 strategy.
Alongside SAFE, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) seeks to strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base through joint procurement and production.
Turkey remains excluded from both initiatives.
Not because of technological shortcomings.
But because of politics.
How Cyprus became a European issue
Cyprus’ accession to the European Union in 2004 transformed the dispute.
What had previously been considered a regional conflict under United Nations mediation became an internal European matter.
From that moment onward, every major discussion concerning EU-Turkey relations acquired a Cypriot dimension.
Nicosia gained institutional leverage that allows it to influence the Union’s broader foreign and security policy toward Ankara.
For Cyprus, this has become a central diplomatic strategy: internationalising the Cyprus issue by embedding it firmly within European decision-making.
Brussels seeks a renewed diplomatic role
The European Commission is attempting to play a more active role in supporting renewed negotiations.
The appointment of Executive Vice-President Raffaele Fitto to help reinforce EU engagement in the UN-led process has been welcomed by Cyprus as evidence that Brussels is prepared to invest political capital in reviving talks.
President Nikos Christodoulides described the move as another tangible result of Cyprus’ long-term European strategy.
Turkey, however, responded with scepticism.
Ankara reiterated its long-standing position that the European Union lost its neutrality when it admitted Cyprus as a member in 2004 before achieving a comprehensive settlement.
Europe’s strategic dilemma
The European Union now faces an increasingly uncomfortable contradiction.
On one hand, it needs Turkey.
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the value of Turkey’s defence industry, its military capabilities and its strategic geography.
On the other hand, the Union cannot ignore the security concerns of one of its own member states.
Strategic necessity collides directly with political principle.
This tension is becoming more visible as Europe accelerates defence integration while simultaneously searching for reliable industrial and military partners.
More than a frozen conflict
The Cyprus question is no longer merely an unresolved territorial dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean.
It has become one of the defining political constraints shaping Europe’s future defence policy.
The debate is therefore much larger than Turkey’s participation in specific programmes.
It concerns the future architecture of European security itself.
Can Europe build credible strategic autonomy without Turkey?
Or can Turkey become part of Europe’s defence future while Cyprus remains divided?
For now, Brussels has no convincing answer to either question.
And until one emerges, Cyprus will continue to hold one of the most influential—and least discussed—vetoes over Europe’s evolving security order.