The European Commission has placed three of the most contentious issues in the Eastern Mediterranean back at the centre of EU–Turkey relations: the Turkey–Libya maritime memorandum, Ankara’s longstanding casus belli against Greece, and Turkish interference with the Great Sea Interconnector, the electricity project designed to connect Cyprus to the European energy network.
In its annual report on Turkey, released on Wednesday, November 4, 2026, as part of the EU Enlargement Package, the Commission documents continuing disputes between Ankara and two EU member states, Greece and Cyprus, despite the improvement in Greek–Turkish relations since 2023.
The significance extends beyond the individual disputes.
Brussels is placing Turkey’s conduct in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean within the broader framework of the obligations expected of a country seeking closer integration with the European Union.
The report acknowledges Turkey’s strategic importance in migration, regional security, trade and connectivity. At the same time, it highlights the unresolved tensions surrounding maritime jurisdiction, sovereignty, international law and Cyprus.
For Athens and Nicosia, the findings provide additional diplomatic support at a time when Ankara is seeking to expand its regional influence.
The Turkey–Libya Memorandum: Brussels Reaffirms Its Rejection
The most consequential section of the report concerns the 2019 maritime memorandum between Turkey and Libya.
The agreement returned to the diplomatic agenda following its ratification by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives in Benghazi on October 20, 2026.
The European Commission reiterates the EU position that the memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states, is incompatible with the law of the sea and cannot produce legal consequences for countries that are not parties to it.
The language follows a joint statement issued on October 20 by European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
The two European leaders described the memorandum as “null and void” and reaffirmed European solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.
The timing is significant.
The Libyan parliament’s move revived concerns in Athens that Ankara could seek to use the agreement to support further maritime claims or activities in contested areas of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece has consistently rejected the memorandum, arguing that Turkey and Libya cannot delimit maritime zones in a manner that disregards the rights of intervening Greek islands.
Turkey, by contrast, maintains that the agreement reflects what it considers its legitimate maritime entitlements.
The European Commission’s position reinforces the Greek argument that bilateral maritime agreements cannot prejudice the rights of third countries.
However, the EU’s rejection does not, by itself, prevent Turkey from pursuing activities based on its own interpretation of maritime jurisdiction.
The central question is whether the renewed political backing for the memorandum will be followed by further operational steps in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey’s Casus Belli Remains a Major European Concern
The second major issue concerns the Turkish parliament’s 1995 declaration threatening war if Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea.
The European Commission recalls that Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for territorial seas extending up to 12 nautical miles.
Greece regards the extension of its territorial waters as a sovereign right under international law.
Turkey opposes such an extension in the Aegean, arguing that the area’s particular geography would have major consequences for its interests and access to maritime spaces.
Ankara is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, while Athens maintains that the 12-nautical-mile rule also reflects customary international law.
The Commission’s report does not resolve the dispute.
It does, however, identify the continued existence of the threat of war as a serious obstacle in Turkey’s relations with an EU member state.
The distinction matters politically.
While Greece and Turkey have maintained diplomatic communication channels, the underlying Turkish parliamentary declaration has not been withdrawn.
For Brussels, improved dialogue cannot substitute for respect for peaceful dispute resolution.
The Blue Homeland Doctrine and Renewed Aegean Tensions
The report also addresses Turkey’s claims concerning the demilitarisation of Greek islands and positions that challenge Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.
Particular concern is expressed over the inclusion of the Blue Homeland doctrine, known in Turkish as Mavi Vatan, in Turkish school textbooks.
The doctrine has become an important element of Turkey’s maritime strategy and is associated with expansive claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
The Commission additionally records renewed overflights by Turkish military aircraft above Greek islands, including inhabited ones, and an increase in reported violations of Greek airspace and territorial waters.
According to the report, relevant incidents occurred as recently as September 2026.
These findings contrast with the diplomatic improvement recorded since 2023.
The report effectively distinguishes between the atmosphere of bilateral relations and the substance of the unresolved disputes.
Regular meetings between officials may reduce the risk of escalation, but they do not necessarily imply agreement on sovereignty, maritime boundaries or military activity.
The Greece–Cyprus Electricity Cable: An EU Project Facing Turkish Objections
A separate and strategically important section concerns the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI).
The project is intended to connect Cyprus to the European electricity network through Greece, helping to address the island’s longstanding energy isolation.
It has been designated a Project of Common Interest (PCI) within the European Union.
The Commission reports that Turkey continued to obstruct survey activities associated with the project’s implementation.
This finding gives the dispute a broader European dimension.
The interconnector is not merely a bilateral infrastructure investment. It forms part of the EU’s energy connectivity strategy and is intended to strengthen the integration and resilience of European electricity networks.
Turkey has objected to survey activities in maritime areas where it considers itself to possess rights or jurisdiction.
Greece and Cyprus, meanwhile, view such interference as an obstacle to the implementation of a legitimate energy infrastructure project.
By explicitly recording Turkish obstruction, the Commission provides Athens and Nicosia with an additional argument in discussions over the project’s future.
Yet the report does not announce new sanctions or operational measures to guarantee the project’s implementation.
The distinction between political support and practical enforcement remains crucial.
For the two EU member states, the immediate challenge is to translate European backing into progress on the ground.
Patriot Missiles, Greek F-16s and New Security Disputes
The Commission also examines Turkish reactions to Greek defence deployments amid heightened regional instability.
These include Ankara’s objections to the deployment of a Patriot air-defence system on the Greek island of Karpathos and the presence of Greek F-16 aircraft in Cyprus during the security crisis linked to developments in the Middle East.
Athens and Nicosia have presented their defensive measures as responses to regional security threats.
Turkey has linked some of its objections to its longstanding positions on the status of Greek islands and the security balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The report also records Turkish objections concerning Greek marine parks and maritime spatial planning.
These issues have added new areas of disagreement to an already complex diplomatic agenda.
They illustrate how environmental policy, energy infrastructure and military deployments can become intertwined with disputes over sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction.
The Hague: Brussels Calls for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
One of the report’s most politically significant elements is its reference to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
The European Commission calls on Turkey to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to good-neighbourly relations, international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
That framework includes the possibility of referring disputes to the International Court of Justice where appropriate.
However, the reference does not mean that Greece and Turkey have agreed to take their disagreements to The Hague.
Such proceedings require an appropriate jurisdictional basis. A referral through a special agreement would require the parties to agree on the dispute submitted to the Court.
Greece has traditionally maintained that the central legal dispute suitable for international adjudication concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone.
Turkey has sought to place a broader range of issues on the bilateral agenda.
This difference remains a major obstacle to a joint referral.
The Commission’s message is therefore not that an agreement has been reached, but that disputes must be addressed through legal and peaceful means rather than threats or unilateral escalation.
Cyprus: Ankara’s Two-State Position Conflicts With the UN Framework
The Commission’s assessment is equally critical of Turkey’s position on Cyprus.
Ankara continues not to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and supports a two-state settlement.
That position differs from the framework established by the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
The European Union reiterates that the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognised state on the island.
It also calls on Turkey to contribute constructively to efforts for a comprehensive, just and sustainable settlement under UN auspices.
The report addresses unilateral actions in Varosha, Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus and activities involving unmanned aircraft.
Another issue concerns the July 2026 memorandum between Turkey and the internationally unrecognised entity in northern Cyprus for the construction of a subsea natural gas pipeline, without the consent of the Republic of Cyprus.
For Nicosia, the Commission’s findings reinforce the argument that normalisation of EU–Turkey relations cannot be separated from developments on the island.
Cyprus remains one of the most consequential unresolved issues in Turkey’s relationship with the European Union.
What the Report Means for Athens and Nicosia
The report provides Greece with an official European assessment of several of its central disputes with Turkey.
Athens can point to the Commission’s rejection of the Turkey–Libya memorandum, its concerns over the casus belli and its findings on the Great Sea Interconnector in diplomatic discussions with EU institutions and member states.
For Cyprus, the reaffirmation of the EU’s position on the Cyprus settlement framework and the documentation of Turkish activities in surrounding maritime areas are also significant.
The findings strengthen the political and diplomatic basis for raising these issues at European level.
Nevertheless, there is an important distinction between European political support and enforceable measures.
The report does not automatically trigger sanctions against Ankara.
Nor does it establish an operational mechanism for protecting energy surveys or resolving maritime disputes.
The next question is whether the EU’s stated positions will influence concrete decisions on regional energy connectivity, security cooperation and the future of relations with Turkey.
Turkey’s European Paradox: Strategic Partner, Stalled Accession
The Commission’s report also highlights a broader contradiction in EU–Turkey relations.
Turkey remains a strategically important partner for Europe, particularly in migration management, trade, regional security and transport connectivity.
At the same time, its accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018.
The Commission records continued concerns over democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.
It also notes the considerable distance between Ankara’s stated European ambitions and its alignment with EU foreign policy positions.
According to the figures presented in the report, Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy stands at approximately 4%.
Despite these differences, Brussels continues to pursue cooperation with Ankara through a gradual, proportionate and reversible approach.
Progress remains linked to specific conditions, including good-neighbourly relations and respect for the rights of EU member states.
The result is a relationship defined by both strategic necessity and persistent disagreement.
Europe needs dialogue with Turkey on several major regional challenges, but it has not abandoned its objections to Ankara’s conduct in the Aegean, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Message From Brussels
The November 2026 report places the Turkey–Libya maritime memorandum, the 1995 threat of war and the Great Sea Interconnector within the same European political framework.
The three disputes differ in their legal and strategic characteristics, but each directly affects the interests of Greece or Cyprus.
For Athens, the report provides further support for its longstanding positions on maritime rights and international law.
For Nicosia, it reinforces the importance of Cyprus in the broader EU–Turkey relationship.
For Ankara, it demonstrates that improved diplomatic communication with Greece does not eliminate the concerns raised by its policies.
The position of the European leadership had already been made explicit following the Libyan parliament’s October decision.
In their joint statement, António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen reaffirmed that the Turkey–Libya memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the law of the sea and is “null and void.”
Their statement concluded with a clear political message:
“We reaffirm our solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.”
Source: pagenews.gr